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Abstract: The aim of procurement is to achieve savings of public resources. Domestic and 
foreign studies point to the fact that the condition of achieving the savings is sufficient 
competition on the supply side. Slovakia currently belongs to the group of countries with 
low competition in public procurement deals. Furthermore, in this context we have 
compared the best practices of using public funds with regard to public procurement in the 
Czech Republic. The aim of this paper is to create and analyze models of the number of 
tenders subcontractor participation and open competition on the savings achieved in public 
procurement. Based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in the R software is demonstrated 
that public procurement in an average is a way to save public funds. Using linear 
regression in R program positive effect of the number of offers to saving process is 
identified. Across the investigated group as well as at dividing to limit and above the limit 
contracts, any further offer increased energy in average of 3%. Participation of the 
subcontractor has positive effect on savings in the whole study group and at above limit 
contracts over 1.35 million euros without value added tax. Open competition as a kind of 
public procurement is not statistically significant in pursuit of savings in procurement for a 
given sample.  
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Introduction  
 
Through the allocation of public contracts to entities in the private sector  
a substantial portion of public funds is being annually allocated. Public 
procurement represents a significant part of the demand for goods and services in 
the economy (OFT, 2004). Public sector as shoppers can affect the structure of 
supply (Fiorentino, 2006). The condition is the effective functioning of the public 
procurement process. Higher efficiency of public procurement can bring substantial 
savings in spending public funds (Špinerová, 2014). It is necessary to set clear, 
standardized rules and manage all process (Litră, Burlacu, 2014). Effectiveness of 
public procurement can be assessed by the final contract prices achieved (Pavel, 
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2010), while an important prerequisite for cost reduction and eventual final price 
for the public sector is the existence of sufficient competition in the market. 
According to the European Commission (2008) competition on the supply side 
may be judged by the number of bidders in public procurement – the number of 
submitted bids/offers. European Commission (2011) in his study approximates by 
the number of offers the efficiency of public procurement, which is based on the 
assumption that a larger number of applicants enables award the contract to the 
tender quality for lower price. It is therefore necessary to ensure transparency in 
public procurement (Vlach, Ursíny, 2007; Survila et al., 2016). This requires the 
elimination of corruption and prevention of cartels between entities entering into 
the procurement process (Cieślik, Goczek, 2015). Results of the study for the 
Czech shows that the problem of corruption increases with firm size (Virglerová et 
al., 2016). According to OECD (2005) such agreements undermine confidence in 
the competitiveness of procurement, not to mention the resulting unfavorable price 
or the quality of the delivered object in the winning bid. In cases of detected cartels 
they increased the market prices by several tens of percents (Zemanovičová et al., 
2010). For construction work, it was up to 30-50% (Grega and Nemec, 2015). 
Rose-Ackerman (2016) came to an interesting observation that when the country 
removes conditions of unfair competition and corruption, the results of public 
procurement in three offers cannot be worse than the results of public procurement 
in six offers. One of the key ways for resolving this problem in the procurement 
process is sufficient competition on the supply side, which together with other 
factors affect the achievement of the lowest prices. This argument is based on 
several scientific studies, for example Danger and Capobianco (2008), European 
Commission (2000), or Nemec et al. (2005). Kuhlman and Johnson (1983), Gilley 
and Karels (1981) tend to believe that the direct competition has more significant 
influence (number of submitted tenders) than potential competition (possible entry 
into the industry). 
Lower efficiency in public procurement causes waste, which the authors 
Bandiera et al. (2008) distinguish between the active and passive. Examples of 
active waste can be the occurrence of corrupt practices in the procurement process, 
while a passive source of waste may be the inability or lack of motivation of public 
officials to minimize costs. The results of the study carried out by the example of 
public procurement in Italy in 2000-2005 suggest that larger part of the inefficiency 
stems from passive waste – pure inefficiency, than the presence of corruption in the 
procurement process. On the other hand, the results of a study aimed at analyzing 
the state of public procurement in Slovakia declare the fact that public procurement 
is one of the main sources of corruption and bribery in the public sector. The 
reason is the lack of transparency in public procurement, shortcomings in 
legislation or incorrect approach in the implementation of procurement (Vlach, 
Nemec, 2001). In recent years there has been a substantial modification of 
legislation and the introduction of e-auction, which contributed to the growth of 
transparency. It should show an increase in the number of tenders in public 
procurement and subsequently increase savings for the public sector. 
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Original value of this article resides in the fact that it demonstrates the 
positive effects of public procurement while using public funds. Moreover, by 
using adequate statistical tools, the article also confirms what is the level of 
savings, e.g. when we take into account participating of more candidates and it 
goes down to the qualification of such effects – savings. 
 
1. Theoretical background  
 
Competition on the supply side of public procurement is influenced by  
a variety of factors. Not all of them can be directly affected by the submitter of the 
public contract. We can include the structure of supply-side position in the 
economic cycle, and conditions in the credit market into this group of factors 
(Harland et al., 2013). In sectors that are associated with high costs of entry into the 
industry it is not possible to ensure sufficient competitive environment, which 
could lead to greater savings in procurement (Shrestha and Pradhananga, 2010). On 
the other hand, submitter has the effect of setting qualifications, the definition of 
the subject of performance, type of tender (open, restricted, etc.). Closely specified 
subject matter and too stringent demands on suppliers reduce the number of 
subjects that may be in the public procurement process involved (Pavel, 2010). A 
common problem is the participation of unqualified candidates. Therefore, public 
administration should evaluate candidates based on selected criteria. It is possible 
to use a variety of models and methods disclosed, for example Plebankiewicz 
(2012), Manoliadis et al. (2009) or Lam and Yu (2011). In practice, they set out the 
criteria under which it is possible to evaluate the ability of the supplier to perform 
the contract (Hatush, Skitmore, 1997). 
In the studies dealing with this issue, the authors come to a single 
conclusion that there is inverse relationship between the number of bids and final 
price. In other words, growth in the number of offers has positive influence on 
savings in public procurement (Becerra et. al., 2016; Nipun, Kwan, 2017). 
A comprehensive analysis of this issue was carried out by the European 
Commission (2008). It worked with data on 13370 over limit public contracts in 
the EU in 2004-2007. The results showed that in the process of public procurement 
the largest price reduction was caused by second offer, which reduced the price by 
4.5%. At third and fourth contact was the reduction 1.2% in average. In 2004-2006, 
the authors Onur et al. (2012) analyzed public procurement in Turkey. They came 
to the conclusion that every other candidate involved in public procurement 
reduces the final price by an average of 3.9%. On average was into public 
procurement in these period involved 3.09 candidates.  
Kuhlman and Johnson (1983) have focused on the examination of the 
impact of price offers for public contracts in the construction of highways in the 
United States (Rose, 2016). They concluded that the number of tenders reduces the 
final price and any further offer will lower the price by an average of 2% of the 
estimated one. A similar study with the same result on the final cost of public 
procurement can also be found at Otis, Gilley and Gordon V. Karels (1981). Gupta 
(2002) found that to ensure the highest competition, which would affect the price 
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drop 6-8 offering companies are needed. Each additional offer has no effect on the 
final price. His study focused on the analysis of transport infrastructure (in 
particular the construction of motorways) in Florida (USA) in the years 1981-1986. 
In the case of 2-8 tenders was the saving 12-14% on average. 
Significant impacts of the high number of offers on the final price of the 
contract identified Gómez-Lobo and Szymanski (2001), who observed the impact 
of competition on the results of the application of CCT (Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering) in the UK. Public sector organizations are forced to compete for their 
work with the private sector since 1988. The most significant positive benefit for 
the client should be, according to their calculations the arrival of the second offer, 
which on average reduced the price by 12-13%. 
Millet et al. (2004) consider use e-auction, which should ensure greater 
competition on the supply side, to be important. According to the authors, optimal 
number tenders would be the 5-6. At a larger number of offers there is already a 
decline in prices which would be desirable. If are e-auction associated with 
excessively large transaction costs, an exclusion of small and medium enterprises 
will occur, which would negatively affect the competitive environment 
(Krasnokutskaya, Seim, 2011). 
 
2. Public procurement in Slovakia and Czech Republic 
 
A research study by Strand (2011) on the public procurement in EU 
countries showed that Slovakia is among the countries with the lowest number of 
offers in public procurement. The Czech Republic is in sixth place from the end. 
Along with the problem of corruption, the public procurement system cannot fulfill 
its basic principles (Greg, Nemec, 2015). Pavel (2013) in his study pointed out that 
Eastern European countries have a serious problem with the number of offers 
entered in procurement. 
Šípoš and Klátik (2013) evaluated tender in Slovakia on a sample of 6800 
tenders of 3.9 billion Euros. Two thirds of these tenders are conducted via tender 
which is the most open procurement method and the average number of candidates 
for public procurement is three offerings. In 2009, there were an average of 2.3 
deals and in 2011 3.6 offers (Šípoš, 2012). Results of the study showed that 
increasing number of offers has the effect of reducing the final price, but saving on 
two bids was greater than the savings in three or four offers. In the case of 
Slovakia, the analysis of the impact of offers savings in the procurement was the 
study object of Greg and Nemec (2015), who investigated 27000 cases of public 
procurement in the years 2009–2013 and concluded that the number of offers has 
implications for savings in public procurement. 
Analysis of the influence of selected factors on the final price in public 
procurement in transport infrastructure in Slovakia and the Czech Republic is the 
study object of Pavel (2009, 2010) from Transparency International. He examines 
in his study the effect of offers, the participation of the subcontractor, the method 
of public procurement, the growth of the industry and time to the final cost of 
public procurement. In addition, he monitors the impact of the selection criteria for 
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the sheer number offers. Pavel explains that the growth in supply increases the 
likelihood that a new more efficient company will appear, which thanks to its lower 
costs will be able to offer a lower price. More offers thus pushing the price down 
while also preventing the formation of cartels. In the case of Slovakia 100 contracts 
was watched while based on the polynomial model it has been shown, that any 
further offer causes savings in the procurement of an average of 4.8% (Pavel, 
2009). In the case of the Czech Republic, 202 contracts were watched and on 
average there was a saving of 3.27% (Pavel, 2008). The second option is squeezing 
the margins of existing producers down. His econometric analysis excluded the 
correlation between the number of bids and contract size. Therefore, it is not true 
that large orders can be done only by a small number of subjects. In the case of 
other than an open contract, so, a public tender, there is a decline in the number of 
offers The presence of subcontractor causes an increase in the final price from the 
estimated one. In the case of Slovakia, this was an increase from 9.8 to 11.6%, thus 
having a negative impact on the creation of savings. Pavel explains it by the fact, 
that the subcontractor is usually also a construction company, which due to 
subcontracting relationship could not enter the competition. This led to a restriction 
of competition on the supply side, with a negative impact on the price (Pavel, 
2009). Pavel (2010, 2013) came to the conclusion that the restricted procedure 
causes a decrease in savings by an average of 11-19% for the Czech transport 
infrastructure. In the case of Slovak transport infrastructure this variable has not 
been examined (Pavel, 2009, Hrdlička, 2009). Pavel and also Hrdlička examine 
selected contracts also via distribution into below and above limit companies. 
Hanak and Muchová (2015) examined 256 contracts in the construction and 
transport infrastructure in the Czech Republic in 2014-2015. 
The research presented in this paper examined the number of offers in a 
relation to the type of subject matter of the tender and the difference in tender 
prices (award vs. expected prices). A disparity in the number of offers between 
contracts for transport infrastructure and contracts for public buildings and 
facilities was found, which, however, does not have a significant impact on the 
level of competition. This research has also revealed a positive moderate 
correlation between the number of offers and the amount of relative price 
decrement measured between award and expected prices. It can therefore be 
concluded that the number of offers in a tender plays a huge role in the context of 
the overall efficiency of the project. Contracting authorities should encourage 
active participation of the largest possible number of bidders in the tender while 
maintaining sufficient qualification requirements. This type of approach could lead 
to a greater probability of achieving lower award prices. On the other hand, 
suppliers should be aware of the anticipated competition in the tender and adjust 
their bid prices accordingly to increase their chances of winning the contract. 
Zachar and Dančíková (2012) developed the analysis of procurement of 
Slovak hospitals in 2009-2012 which found that in 54.6% of tender was the offer 
submitted by only one candidate. For comparison, in other sectors outside of health 
care, the proportion of tenders will be shown with only one bidder, i.e. with one of 
the offer by more than 40% lower than in the hospitals. On the other hand, the 
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share of contracts with 5 or more candidates featured in sectors others than 
healthcare was almost 18%, while hospital tenders were only slightly more than 
6%. The average number of offers in hospital tenders is 1.7. In other sectors of the 
Slovak economy it was on average during the same period, less than 3 bids for 
tender. This means that in public procurement is the health sector exposed to lower 
intensity of competition between suppliers, which may be caused by closely 
specified subject matter. In the Czech Republic competition between suppliers in 
the health sector is two times higher. 
 
3. Objective and methodology 
 
The aim of this paper is to compile models of effect of selected variables 
on the ratio of the final price and the estimated one at public procurement in 
Slovakia for the period 2010-2016. The sample required for analysis consists of 
500 public procurement contracts in Slovakia from the period January 2010 - 
December 2016. These contracts are published in the Journal of electronic public 
procurement. Contracts are then divided into so-called below the limit and above 
the limit ones, where the criterion is median of the estimated price of the total 
sample. Based on the median, representing the value of 1.35 million Euros net 
orders were divided into two subsets. The first subset of below the limit contracts 
comprised 246 contracts with a value below 1.35 million Euros without VAT. The 
second set consisted of 254 contracts with a value of 1.35 million Euros without 
VAT. The reason for the division of the group into two samples is that the selected 
variables can have a different impact on the final rate and the estimated value 
depending on the size of the contract. 
The monitored variables are participation of subcontractor, type of public 
procurement, (open - tender, closed - other than open procedures), and in particular 
the number of tenders which are in various contracts involved in the procurement 
process. Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of the selected sample by the 
monitored criteria. 
 
Table 1. Basic characteristics of the sample 
Factor All contracts 
Below limit 
contracts 
Above limit 
contracts 
No. of offers 1 35.47 % 33.73 % 37.2 % 
2 19.64 % 17.67 % 21.6 % 
3 17.43 % 21.29 % 13.6 % 
4   8.82 %   9.23 %   8.4 % 
5   6.64 %   5.22 %   8.0 % 
6 and more 12.01 % 12.86 % 11.2 % 
Participation of 
the subcontractor 
yes 75.55 % 81.14 % 70.0 % 
no 24.45 % 18.86 % 30.0 % 
Type of public 
procurement 
open 66.33 % 74.70 % 58.0 % 
closed 33.67 % 25.30 % 42.0 % 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
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Based on data from Table 1 it is clear that the largest number of public 
procurement (35.47%) was realized by the attendance of only one offer. In the case 
of contracts below the limit that was 33.73% and an above limit contracts 37.2%. 
Two bids were received for the 19.64% of all monitored contracts. Overall, as more 
than half of public procurement was carried out in the presence of one or two 
offers. This is true in the above limit and below the limit contracts. The 
participation of subcontractor was present in 75.55% of cases. The subcontractor 
was present slightly more (81.14%) in below limit contracts than in above limit 
ones (70%). The open competition was used in the case of 66.33% of public 
procurement. It was used 16.7% more in below limit contracts. 
On the platform of outputs from the available research studies we are in the 
context of fulfilling the objective of our study that is set into these hypotheses: 
H1: Public procurement has a positive effect on saving of public funds. 
H2: As the number of offers on average grows the ratio of the final and the 
estimated price of selected contacts in public procurement decreases. 
H3: Participation of the subcontractor has an impact on the growth rate of 
final and estimated price of selected contracts in public procurement. 
H4: The open competition has an impact on the fall of the final and the 
estimated price of selected contracts in public procurement.  
H5: Number of offers, participation and openness of the contract has 
different implications on the ratio of final and estimated price at 
below limit and above limit contracts. 
Hypotheses relate to the ratio of the final and estimated price. This ratio is 
desirable to reduce, because if the ratio is lower, more savings occur in public 
procurement. In H2 an assumption is established that the growth in the number of 
offers will affect the growth of savings in public procurement as proven by several 
studies. Based on the study of Pavel (2009) we assume that the participation of 
subcontractor makes the final price higher and will have a negative impact on the 
creation of savings. This finding was reflected in the H3. The H4 assumes that 
open competition will have a positive impact on the creation of savings. In an open 
procedure the announcer announces a competition for an unlimited number of 
candidates. This should lead to more offers and consequently to greater savings in 
procurement. Based on the differences between below and above limit contracts 
seen in Table 1 the H5 was constructed which foresees different impact of selected 
variables to create savings in these groups of orders. To verify H1 Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used in program R. To test the effect of selected variables in 
hypotheses H2–H5 on the ratio of the final and the estimated price linear regression 
again in R program is used, which verifies the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation, multicollinearity, as well as whether the residues of the normal 
distribution model. First it tested the impact of variables on the full set of 500 
contracts and then the two samples according to the reference value of 1.35 million 
Euros without VAT. The statistical significance is decided by the p-value. We 
consider 95% (α = 0.05) as standard level of significance of the tests. 
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4. Analysis and results 
 
Analytical part was constructed into two continuous lines. We were 
interested in the quantification of savings in procurement at below limit and above 
limit contracts, as well as the impact of selected factors on the creation of savings. 
 
4.1. Savings in public procurement 
 
The aim of public procurement is the creation of savings which means, that 
the result should be the final price lower than the estimated one. The results of 
achieving savings in the study group are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Savings in public procurement 
Criterion All 
contracts 
Below limit 
contracts 
Above limit 
contracts Saving Total saving  60.60 %  59.77 %  61.32 % 
subcontractor 29.47 % 23.53 % 35.57 % 
no subcontractor 70.53 % 76.47 % 64.43 % 
open competition 74.50 % 84.97 % 63.76 % 
other type of 
competition 
25.50 % 15.03 % 36.24 % 
Overprice Total overprice  11.20 %  12.89 %    9.46 % 
subcontractor 23.21 % 18.18 % 30.43 % 
no subcontractor 76.79 % 81.82 % 69.57 % 
open competition 66.07 % 81.81 % 43.48 % 
other type of 
competition 
33.93 % 18.19 % 56.52 % 
Unchanged 
price 
Total unchanged 
price 
 28.20 %  27.34 %  29.22 % 
subcontractor 14.18 %   8.57 % 19.72 % 
no subcontractor 85.82 % 91.43 % 80.28 % 
open competition 48.94 % 48.57 % 49.30 % 
other type of 
competition 
51.06 % 51.43 % 50.70 % 
Relative average saving    8.98 %    9.17 %     8.79 % 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
Table 2 clearly shows that there is inefficiency in the Slovak public 
procurement. The reason is the existence of contracts that ultimately ended up as 
overpriced and formed 11.2% throughout the sample. Regardless of the sample size 
is a negative phenomenon that is manifested in excessive waste of public resources. 
Up to 28.2% of contracts ended without saving, which due to costs related to the 
provision of public procurement can also be assessed as ineffective. Overall, only 
about 40% of orders from the group represented increased costs for the public 
sector, which showed either overprice or zero savings in procurement. In case of 
above limit contracts there was 1.5% more contracts with savings. About 3.43% 
more contracts were overpriced at below limit contracts and by 1.88% more 
contracts were unchanged at a price at below limit contracts. Savings were 
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frequently achieved without the participation of the subcontractor (70.53%). 
Likewise, also overpriced and procurement with an unchanged price was more than 
the 76% achieved without subcontractor. This therefore means that based on Table 
2 we cannot identify the impact of the participation of subcontractor in the creation 
of savings. It is necessary to check the influence of linear regression. Open 
procedure occurred in 74% of procurement with a savings and in 66% of 
procurement with overprice. It is necessary to verify the impact of open 
competition through a linear regression in R program. 
To test H1 statistical testing of the means of compliance was carried with 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in program R. The test is used for the entire sample 
of contracts as well as below limit and above limit contracts. The test results are 
presented in Table 3, the statistical significance was distinguished by stars, based 
on p-value test (*** 0,001; ** 0,01; * 0,05). 
 
Table 3. Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Wilcoxon 
signed-
rank test 
The null 
hypothesis 
Alternative 
hypothesis 
All 
contracts 
Below 
limit 
contracts 
Above 
limit 
contracts 
Double 
sided test 
There are no 
differences in 
the estimated 
and the final 
price 
There are 
differences in 
the estimated 
and the final 
price 
<2.2 . 10-16 
*** 
7.24 . 10-13 
*** 
<2.2 . 10-16 
*** 
One-
sided test 
There are no 
differences in 
the estimated 
and the final 
price 
The 
introduction of 
public 
procurement 
leads to 
savings 
<2.2 . 10-16 
*** 
1.49 . 10-12 
*** 
<2.2 . 10-16 
*** 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
Based on the test results we can say with certainty, that given the value of 
p, which is in all cases, even when double sided and one-sided tests at a value less 
than the value of 0.05 – we accept the hypothesis that there is a real savings in 
procurement in all three samples, so we can accept H1. 
 
4.2. The influence of selected factors on the formation of savings in 
public procurement 
 
In program R the effect of selected variables (number of offers, 
subcontractors’ participation and influence of open competition) was tested on the 
ratio of the final and estimated price (in %). First effect has been tested in a wide 
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set of 500 samples at a significance level of 0.05. The results of the linear 
regression are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  The results of linear regression for all contracts 
Dependent variable The final price as a % of the estimated price 
Explanatory variables Effect Statistical significance 
Constant 103.167 < 2e-16 
Number of offers -2.9703 4.17e-14 
Participation of the subcontractor -4.4142 0.0341 
Open competition -3.5146 0.0704 
R2 0.2605 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
The model shows that the growth in the number of offers on average 
decreases the ratio of the final and the estimated value of public contracts, which is 
confirmed by H2. Each additional offer causes a decrease in the final price as % of 
the estimated price by an average of 2.9703%. It is more precisely seen in Table 3, 
which represents the average decline in the final price to the expected price at 
various numbers of tenders. 
 
Table 5. Impact of the number of offers on the share of final and estimated 
price for all monitored contracts 
No. of offers 
The average final price decline 
to the estimated price 
Change 
1   2.391 % - 
2   4.795 % 2.404 % 
3   6.891 % 2.096 % 
4 13.871 % 6.980 % 
5 16.064 % 2.193 % 
6 17.811 % 1.747 % 
7 and more 15.301 %  -2.510 % 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
 
Table 5 points to the fact that any further offer brings in average a greater 
saving in procurement. This effect is being depleted at sixth bid. The largest 
increase in savings is recorded entering the fourth offer, which produces an average 
increase in savings by 6.9% compared with saving when there are three candidates. 
The results of Table 4 reject H3, which claims that participation of subcontractors 
has an impact on the growth rate of final and estimated value. Based on the results 
of the linear regression performed on a sample of 500 contracts it has been shown 
to reduce the rate of final and estimated price by 4.942% in average. This therefore 
means that the involvement of subcontractors increases savings in procurement in a 
given sample. The open competition was by the given a model identified as 
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statistically significant, which means that we cannot neither accept nor reject H4 in 
the sample. 
 
4.3. The influence of selected factors on the formation of savings in 
below the limit and over limit contracts 
 
Below limit contracts are defined as those, which have the estimated price at 
lower level than 1.35 million Euros without VAT. It is the number of 246 contracts 
from the original sample from the years 2010–2016. Results of the linear regression 
are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Results of linear regression, the below limit contracts 
Dependent variable  The final price as a % of the estimated price 
Explanatory variables Effect Statistical significance 
Constant 103.048 < 2e-16 *** 
Number of offers -3.0511 1.64e-08 *** 
Participation of the subcontractor -2.741 0.303 
Open competition -3.2651 0.183 
R2 0.2859 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
At below limit contracts only the effect of offers´ number on the resulting 
ratio of the final and estimated price has been shown. Every extra offer, on 
average, reduced the rate by 3.05%. This means that with every additional offer 
grow the savings in procurement by 3% in average. Participation of a subcontractor 
or an open competition were not statistically significant in the sample. Above limit 
contracts consist of a set of contracts in the number or 254, the estimated cost was 
over 1.35 million Euros without VAT. Results of linear regression of the above 
limit contracts are visible in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Results of linear regression, the above limit contracts 
Dependent variable The final price as a % of the estimated price 
Explanatory variables Effect Statistical significance 
Constant 103.2602 < 2e-16 *** 
Number of offers -2.9976 2.73e-07 *** 
Participation of the 
subcontractor 
-6.736 0.0489 * 
Open competition -3.3356 0.2972 
R2 0.2338 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
In the case of this sample is once again confirmed the influence of the ratio 
of final and estimated price. Each additional offer at above limit contracts causes 
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an average decrease in the ratio by 2.99%. Participation of subcontractor has been 
proven to be significant. Participation of the subcontractor on average reduces the 
ratio of the final and estimated price by 6.73%, with a positive impact on the 
creation of savings. The open competition was not statistically significant variable, 
again. After comparing the effect of selected variables at below the limit and above 
limit contracts we can accept H5. At below and also above limit contracts every 
additional offer caused a decrease in the final price as a % of the estimated one by 
3% on average. Open competition was not statistically significant. H5 has to be 
rejected because of the fact that below limit contracts has the attendance of 
subcontractor as a statistically not significant variable, while at the above limit 
contracts the attendance of subcontractor causes a rise in savings by 6.7% on 
average. At both types of contracts an average fall in the rate of final and estimated 
price has been studied at different number of offers, which is presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Impact of the number of offers on the share of final and estimated 
price at below and above limit contracts 
No. of 
offers 
Below limit contracts Above limit contracts 
Average drop of the 
final price to the 
estimated price in % 
Change 
Average drop of the 
final price to the 
estimated price in % 
Change 
1    -0.013% -   4.670 % - 
2   4.92% 4.933%   4.685 % 0.015 % 
3 10.16% 5.24%   1.810 %   -2.875 % 
4 18.24% 8.08%   9.440 %   7.63 % 
5 17.18% -1.06% 15.040 %   5.60 % 
6  18.21% 1.03% 16.070 %   1.03 % 
7 and more 16.37% 1.84% 13.040 %    -3.03 % 
(Source: authors´ own processing) 
 
After comparing the effect of selected variables at below limit and above 
limit contracts there are significant differences. At one offer, at below limit 
contracts by 0.013% on average was reached an overprice. It is a number close to 
zero, which refers to high inefficiency of public procurement in a particular group. 
This means that the lack of competition on the supply side directly results in zero 
savings in procurement at below the limit contracts. At above limit contracts a 
saving of 4.67% on average was reached at one offer. At below limit contracts was 
the largest savings achieved at 4 offers; at above limit ones at 5 offers. The largest 
increase in savings was achieved in supply growth from three to four in both cases. 
At below limit contracts the effect of savings´ growth depletes at four contracts. At 
above limit contracts is at three bids achieved on average smaller saving than when 
there are two offers, which can be a sign of cartel agreements, since for four and 
more offerings are average savings considerably higher than in the three offer case. 
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5. Discussions 
 
The aim of public procurement is to achieve savings. Using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test in the program R, we managed to prove that in the case of the set 
of all monitored contracts as well as contracts above and below 1.35 million Euros 
without VAT saving are being created on average in public procurement. Overall, 
however, only 40% of the study sample consisted of contracts with the effect of 
overprice or zero savings. This means that the Slovak public procurement system is 
not fully effective. The problem may be for example a badly set estimated price, 
which may be set lower than the actual cost of the contract. However, it may be a 
consequence of the severe disturbances of the public sector, such as corruption and 
the formation of cartels, which cause limited competition on the supply side. A 
sign of a cartel is that in the case of above limit contracts the average savings at 
three offers were lower by 2.8% than in case of two bids. Šípoš and Klátok (2013) 
have come to similar results whose study has shown that savings in three or four 
bids were lower than the savings in the two bids. It is interesting to compare those 
findings with a study of Rose-Ackerman (2016). He came to the realization that if 
conditions of unfair competition and corruption in the country are removed, the 
results of public procurement in three offers´ situation cannot be worse than the 
results of public procurement in six offers´ situation. By the analysis of selected 
contracts was in the case of the entire sample of 500 contracts as well as at below 
and above limit contracts demonstrated that at three contracts significantly lower 
savings were achieved than in the case of six contracts. According to the statements 
of Rose-Ackerman we should assume that in Slovakia there are conditions for 
unfair competition and corruption. On the other hand, if we demand growth of 
savings with the growth of offers, that cannot be achieved in practice.  
In testing the effect of selected variables using a linear model in the R 
software on a sample of 500 contracts it has been shown that any further offer has a 
negative effect on the price of an average of 2.9% of the estimated one, thus saving 
on this percentage, on average, increases with each additional bidder. Saving an 
average of 3% was reached even when there were below limit and above limit 
contracts. For comparison, Nemec and Grega (2015) in their study declared that in 
Slovakia, with each additional offer savings increase an average of 2.63%. The 
results of our analysis showed that competition on the supply side has a positive 
effect on savings in public procurement. The highest average savings throughout 
the investigated group was achieved at six offers´ situation – 16.6%. It means that 
the growth of offers will not make the savings permanently grow; this effect is 
exhaustible just after sixth offer. The largest increase in average savings was at 
four offers by 6.9% compared with the three offers. 
The studies of Czech experts Hrdlička (2009) and Pavel (2009) in the field 
of transport infrastructure pointed out that the participation of a subcontractor 
causes a decrease in savings. Our linear regression model applied to a selected 
sample demonstrated the exact opposite. In all contracts the presence of a 
subcontractor increased the size savings by an average of 4.4%. In the case of 
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above limit contracts an increase if savings by an average of 6.7% was declared. 
When contracts are below limit, the presence of subcontractor has been 
demonstrated as no statistically significant.  
Effect of open competition on the resulting savings in procurement has not 
been examined in other studies. The linear models created in this paper pointed out 
that the effect of open competition is statistically not significant in any sample.  
Conclusions drawn in this study are influenced by the chosen sample of 
public procurement contracts. Other study sample would bring slightly different 
results mainly on the impact of subcontractor and open competition. Those can also 
vary depending on the industry that would be chosen for the analysis. However, it 
is also possible to draw general conclusions arising from the definition of 
efficiency of public procurement. Based on the conducted study, it can be argued 
that in Slovakia there is a weak competition on the supply side of public 
procurement and public procurement consequently does not work effectively. A 
clear proof of this is the existence of contracts which terminate overpriced or with 
zero savings. That in turn causes wastage of public funds. In this paper, we pointed 
out the possible existence of cartels, especially in the case of above limit contracts. 
This argument, however, needs to be in the future further analyzed. 
However, for comparison it is necessary to include also some of the main 
conclusions from the experience of the Czech Republic. For example, we choose 
those that have been used and presented during projects implemented in the Czech 
Republic (Deloitte Advisory, 2012), or directly from the project EFIN – Effective 
institutions for the Ministry of Education during the period 2009-2013 (MŠMT, 
2017).  
This project is directly focused on the promotion and development of 
effective management principles and especially on economic and supportive 
processes in tertiary education institutions (high schools and colleges) and public 
research institutions or other research organizations in the Czech Republic. The 
project has emphasized the principles and activities that have been successfully 
implemented in similar institutions in the Czech Republic and abroad as well as in 
other sectors in the Czech Republic (business, public, non-profit sector, etc.).  
It seems that the basic processes and approaches to savings and to 
implementation of tenders in the area of public procurements are basically the same 
even when compared to more segments of the national economy. For example, we 
can talk about public administration and regional development and the tertiary 
sector including public higher education and public research institutions or 
construction of transport infrastructure as it was demonstrated in the investigation 
realized within a lot of projects. There exist the same principles and features of 
public procurement from the perspective of public procurement in general. 
Furthermore, frequent errors in procurement procedures (discrimination, division 
of orders, qualifications, etc.) are also either the same or very similar. And after all, 
the same are also the consequences of infringement of the law (Deloitte Advisory, 
2012).  
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The project EFIN (MŠMT, 2017) monitored the rate of formalization of 
rules in terms of allocation of funds according to the centres (which generally 
correspond to the breakdown of institutions by their parts), nature of the activity 
(main or supplementary activity or economic and non-economic activity) or 
according to the type of items (e.g. public procurement, projects, grants or 
overheads). What is necessary to implement from the point of view of public 
procurements? The process of acquiring assets (current and capital) and services is 
absolutely crucial and must be standardized. It must be formally described in the 
institution (e.g. a directive on public procurement). The institution must set also 
standardized rules for the process of acquiring the property and the procedure 
leading to the acquisition of assets must be set, too. Rules for the realization of 
public procurement include establishment of a procedure for realizing of tenders 
according to its subject and their estimated value along with a list of documents for 
archiving. The institution must also compare the prices of so called internal and 
external services (internal services are described as spending on service done by 
the internal personnel of the institution whereas external services are spending on 
services done by external bodies). The process of comparing and assessment of 
economic benefits of internal and external services is usually a part of market 
research before the realization of public procurement or it can be provided based 
on ad-hoc requirements.  
Another important parameter for maintaining the efficiency of public 
procurement is publication in the central register of contracts. The publication is 
required by the law. Even for the needs of the institutions, it is important to have 
their own central register of contractual relations with binding structure. It has to 
include following parts: category of the contract, contract type, name of the 
external supplier, name of the contract / description of the subject, contract price, 
cost centre, the duration of its validity, the expected date of expiration of the 
contract. It is important to include not only the contacts but also any additions or 
acceptance protocols. For a standard overview, the evidence must demonstrate 
what is the subject of a public procurement, definition of this subject, the type of 
procurement procedure, the estimated price and timing during the contract 
(launching and termination) and the person in charge. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The issue of public procurement is devoted to several authors who 
consistently argue that to achieve savings in procurement it is necessary to ensure 
sufficient competition on the supply side. This is possible only by removing the 
corruption and avoiding cartels. From the current OECD studies, however, is 
shown that Slovakia has a relatively small number of offers engaging in 
procurement resulting in little or any savings in public procurement.   
In this paper, we focused on public procurement in Slovakia in 2010-2016, 
we further examined using linear regression. To monitor sample we managed to 
prove that public procurement has an average positive impact on the creation of 
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savings, although there are contracts with overprice, resp. zero savings. We 
confirmed by recent studies, declaring the fact that the growth in the number of 
offers, on average, reduces the final cost of procurement contracts compared to the 
expected price. This means that competition on the supply side has a positive effect 
on the growth of savings in public procurement. However, we were unable to 
demonstrate the impact of open competition, resp. the impact of this variable was 
statistically insignificant. Linear regression model showed that a subcontractor has 
on average a positive impact on the creation of savings in public procurement. 
Major changes need to be done in public procurement in Slovakia that 
would minimize the number of offers with overprice or no savings. It is necessary 
to verify in detail whether the estimated price of contracts is actually the result of 
market price resp. if the lowest price criterion is the most suitable criterion in 
public procurement. It is necessary to strengthen the fight against corruption and 
cartels in public procurement. 
In order to increase efficiency of public procurement in the monitored 
institutions in the Czech Republic, the practice proved to use electronic tools in the 
form of electronic marketplace and dynamic purchasing system for commodities 
that were entered in this way. Benefits that were recorded in the analyzed projects 
in the Czech Republic were generated from the implementation of the principles of 
effective management. These principles have led to an increase in the effectiveness 
of activities and services provided by the institutions and also it has led to an 
increase in the efficiency of funding and resources. Implementation and outcomes 
described in this article (concerning the Czech Republic) has served to strengthen 
the competitiveness of these institutions in national, European and global context. 
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